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Transitionals

Winnicott and Deleuze/Guattari: premise for a new project

September 13, 2011
Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze, Found Object, Freud, Guattari, Machines, MetaTherapeutics, Play, Reflexivity, Schizoanalysis, Speaking Desire, Transitionals, Winnicott

I want to invoke Deleuze and Guattari’s double-sided interrogation: “Given a certain effect, what machine is capable of producing it? And given a certain machine, what can it be used for?” (Anti-Oedipus, F8, E3).

Such an interrogation has fed its authors’ insistence on the primacy of a “machinic production” for human nature, a production for which the greatest threat is the distorting transformation of its status from a fundament into a goal, from a process that deploys its productions, registrations, and consumptions along typically unpredictable lines, which is to say, from a process that plays, dreams, and associates, as Winnicott understood these terms, into a stagnant and interminable “wreck” (AO, F11, E5) that can only “fantasy” and “dissociate” in its struggle for self-perpetuation and propagation.

This is one of a number of links and relays that I would like to pursue between the presumably post-Freudian project of Winnicott and the supposedly anti-Freudian project of Deleuze and Guattari.

My investment is not in a history of psychoanalytic ideas that hopes to bridge the divide between the French and the British, each a tradition that, for the most part, has thrived on recognising its other only to dispute its legitimacy as fantasmatic and/or mundane, on, in other words, dissociating itself from that other, a history, and by extension a methodology, that would invariably, righteously, grant itself the status of an integration or incorporation that is greater, wiser, or truer than both.

Nor is my investment in exposing and clarifying the ways in which each of these two traditions is, after all and presumably, a metaphor for, or, better still, the metamorphosing outcome of the other. I would much rather spare both my Winnicottian and Deleuzo-Guattarian readers the disappointment and/or irritation of witnessing their distinctive perspectives and strongly held convictions dismissed as the derivatives of some previously or elsewhere more convincingly elaborated views.

Nor do I hope to facilitate a triumphal coupling of the two sets of disparate texts and strategies with the aim of producing a clinical and/or meta-psychological offshoot—-a strange beast indeed—-that is part Winnicottian and part Deleuzo-Guattarian, part post- and part anti-, forever honouring, which is also to say forever hemmed in by, its provenance and heritage.

Nor, lastly, is my investment in a utopian “in-between” that has gripped much of the imagination amongst contemporary readers of both Winnicott and Deleuze and Guattari, an “in-between” whose advocates, I suspect, must forever struggle to keep from drowning in the treacherous waters of the Oceanus Britannicus. On this score, and though the notion of a topographical “in-between” seems to be precisely what brings both projects in line with one another, I find the Winnicottian transitional and the Deleuzo-Guattarian intermezzo, when considered primarily as psychological topographies, to be particularly sparse and unyielding. Moreover, and just as the found object for Winnicott is an experience rather than an “object” that needs to be itemised and localised, I would like to suggest that the transitional and the intermezzo are a playing and a bricolage, a basic form of living (“Playing: A Theoretical Statement”, 50) and a handyman’s tinkering (AO, F7, E1) that have little to do with spaces or locations that ought to be mapped, striated, and/or bound, and everything to do with events, processes, and experiences that are lived. Ditto for the “in-between.”

My investment is primarily in re-posing the question of found object and play and of machine and effect, while doubling its data, so to speak. Given two machines, each with its specific set of clinical and theoretical procedures, what can their juxtaposition be used for and what effects can that juxtaposition be made to produce? At stake here is a process that treats of dynamic effects as much as it treats of developmental causes, of potential products as much as of hidden aetiologies, and of eventual deployments as much as of retrograde analyses. Ultimately, my hope in posing this question is that these effects, products, and deployments may not only communicate to us hitherto unexplored yet constitutive theoretical and/or clinical components about either Winnicott or Deleuze and Guattari, but that they may also shed a new light on, if not indeed instantiate desire, and, in the process, allow us to do with that desire, or do with it differently, as much as it does with us.

In positing this reflexive implication, I take my cue from the “machines” I am considering, insofar as each, in its own way, has more or less relinquished as artificial and ineffectual the distinction between the functions of theory and practice, observer and observed, analyst and analysand. Indeed, by the end of his career, Winnicott was quite unequivocal when he declared that psychoanalysis “has to do with two people playing together” (PTS, 38), that such a doing takes place “in the overlap of the two play areas, that of the patient and that of the therapist” (“Playing”, 54), that, in other words, psychoanalysis has little to do with one subject developing, interpreting, or correcting another subject’s experience according to some externally pre-elaborated path toward truth or health, and everything to do with the playing that occurs “in between” these two subjects. Winnicottian psychoanalysis is therefore as much a practice as it is a theory of transitionality; it is therefore as invested in consolidating and legitimising an Ego, a Self, or a Subject, be it true or false, as a found object could be said to consolidate or legitimise a reality, be it hallucinatory or concrete.

Similarly, and equally forcefully, Deleuze and Guattari identified the principal task of their analytic orientation (which they termed “schizoanalysis”) as the dismantling of the distinction between a subject that emits a statement and a subject about or on behalf of whom, or which, a statement is emitted (AO, F323-324, E271). In schizoanalysis, there is no subject that imparts to another its accomplishments in knowledge, health, or experience; there is only an analytic machine that is neither an imaginary projection, as phantasy, nor a real projection, as cure, but a recurring factor of production among parts (associations, syntheses, subjectivities) functioning alongside one another and under specific clinical conditions. These are the gears that create new gears alongside preceding ones, indefinitely, even if, or even as they seem to function in discordant or opposing ways. As Deleuze and Guattari have summed it up, “That which makes a machine [the schizoanalytic sine qua non] are connections, all the connections that operate the disassembly” (Kafka, 84).

That something may be gained from elaborating a relationship between these Deleuzo-Guattarian connections and the Winnicottian transitional, between, in other words, the machine and the found object, that such a relationship can be productive precisely because it is as fractious and abrasive as it may be smooth, that, in other words, the friction between the presumably incongruous concepts and orientations may set off a spark capable of shedding light on hitherto unexplored territories, these are the principle assumptions motivating the project.

Symptom–1

July 28, 2009
Dreaming, Fantasying, MetaTherapeutics, Re-Parenting, Symptom, Transitionals, Winnicott

Interestingly enough, the distinction between fantasying and dreaming and its accompanying language of the “dead end” were not without their parallels for Winnicott. In a series of talks he recorded for the BBC during the 1950s (collected and published under the title of The Child, the Family and the Outside World), and hence from the period shortly after the first appearance of “Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena,” Winnicott flagged “abnormality” as neither a statistical deviation nor a behavioural aberration but as the stagnation in a child’s ability to grow in personality and character. An abnormal child, declared Winnicott, is a child that gets “hung up at some spot” (CFOW, 124) and can go no further in his or her movements and interactions; a normal child, on the other hand, “can employ any or all of the devices nature has provided in defence against anxiety and intolerable conflict” (CFOW, 126-7; emphasis in the original). Consequently, in and of themselves, individual behaviours are neither normal nor abnormal; bed-wetting, for instance, is often an effective protest against strict management while the refusal of food may very well be a rejection of what is experienced as bad. With an ill child, “it is not the symptoms that are the trouble; it is the fact that the symptoms are not doing their job, and are as much a nuisance to the child as to the mother” (CFOW, 127). “Abnormality [Winnicott continues] shows in a limitation and a rigidity in the child’s capacity to employ symptoms and a relative lack of relationship between the symptoms and what can be expected in the way of help” (CFOW, 127; emphasis in the original). Winnicott’s parental concern(∗) was hence focused not on any one particular type or quality of behaviour but on the extent to which a child can use any behaviour, deploy it, and eventually communicate through it. In one respect at least, the psychoanalytic distinction between dreaming and fantasying extends well this concern: dreaming is an index of mobility and interaction that produces its own effects, be they playful, concrete, or illusory, while fantasying is an insular and debilitating end in itself; it brings forth nothing and leads nowhere. Put differently, dreaming grows while fantasying remains “hung up.”

However, and as is often the case with the passage from one reality to another or from one modality to another, Winnicott’s clinical passage from the parental to the psychoanalytic might not have been possible without his reliance on certain less obvious but by no means less critical conceptual considerations. In the spirit of the transitional, one would have to entertain the necessity of such considerations and locate them in the interregnum that is the boundary between the parental and the psychoanalytic as two distinct practices, each with its own standards in matters of procedure, investment, and membership. Curiously, and to my knowledge at least, Winnicott remained silent on the fact of this interregnum and on the conditions and techniques that would make crossing it possible. The effect of this silence is that it reinforces in the reader an impression already sustained by the psychoanalyst’s overarching investment in a clinical practice that, at bottom, is homologous with, if not identical to, parenting, an impression, hence, of a crossing that is effectively a non-event or, at most, an event that occurs with such ease while hardly drawing any attention to itself that it may very well be the symptom of the healthiest and most normal of procedures that are the devices, again, “nature [clinical training] has provided the child [therapist] in defence against anxiety and intolerable conflict [incomprehension and contradiction]” (CFOW, 126-7)! In the face of such “normality,” silence is presumably the most obvious response. However, in response to such a silence, one has a psychoanalytic obligation to ponder the possibility of some underlying anxiety or conflict, assess their eventual impact, and perhaps even investigate the likelihood of responding to them in a way other than the child’s.

Meanwhile, and ever true to his principles, Winnicott was all too keen on propagating this “normality.” Indeed, and with the doctor’s encouragement, it seems as if little need stand in the way of parents becoming their own children’s therapists, as in the case of the mother whose boy suffered from a host of “curious symptoms,” including a most notable obsession with everything to do with strings, for instance. In helping transpose the process of appreciation, verbalisation, and learning from the one dyad (therapist-parent) to the other (parent-child), Winnicott claimed credit for enabling that mother to turn to her little boy and interpret—as a therapist might interpret—his anxiously exaggerated use of a transitional object (a piece of string) by declaring with a confidence and competence that are most inspiring (!) “I can see from your playing with string that you are worried about my going away, but this time I shall only be away a few days, and I am having an operation which is not serious” (TOTP-2, 18). As one might expect, the interpretation yielded the therapeutic response of relieving the boy from his anxiety on the eve of a temporary separation from mother.
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∗ I am opting for the label “parental” as opposed to “paediatric” here because, in the BBC lectures at least, Winnicott the paediatrician was addressing himself as (if he were) a parent to the parents, mostly mothers—as opposed to doctors—encouraging them to trust in the knowledge they have garnered from their experiences of parenting—instead of touting his authority in matters clinical of which they may be ignorant—and, finally, delicately feeding them, as a parent would its offspring, titbits of theory and observation that would make of them even better parents—rather than instructing them in the complexities of diagnosis and treatment.

Structure and Process

June 15, 2009
Aevum, Dreaming, Fantasying, Finding, Play, Transitionals, Winnicott

In the early 1950’s, Winnicott had identified the transitional (whether object, phenomenon, or space) as the bridge between inner life and outer reality, a bridge that, presumably, the subject must set up and continually cross if it is to pursue its developmental journey and reach its full potential as an adult. Twenty years later, Winnicott declared that the clinical focus on the tumultuous relations between the psychic and the shared as separate realities each with its particular set of principles and priorities had long eclipsed serious consideration of a host of experiences that, strictly speaking, belong to neither but are instead grounded in the field of the transitional. In an attempt to redress the paucity of the clinical literature’s treatment of this field and its repercussions for the broader culture, the psychoanalyst decided to republish his “Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena” as the first in a collection of essays (Playing and Reality) that would recast transitionality not only as a function that speaks of a particular psychological dynamic or configuration but as a process that is key in the life of individual and group.

I believe there is more at work in Winnicott’s position from the 1970’s than the simple expansion of a previously elaborated point of view or the restatement, this time louder and more voluminous, literally, of the two-decade-old call that clinical attention be directed toward a crucial but so far under-investigated dynamic. Much as this was the last project Winnicott published in his lifetime and hence, as considered by many, the crowning achievement of his formidable clinical career, the collection stands as less its author’s synthesising and conclusive word on the status and function of the transitional and more as a self-contained but, nonetheless (thankfully), “imperfect” process in which both the transitional and the entire structure within which it operates are re-worked and re-calibrated.

I say “imperfect” because, indeed, there is much inconsistency to Winnicott’s last position, inconsistency of which, I imagine, its author was not entirely unaware, inconsistency to which he evidently had been all too eager to attach the label “paradox” as he had done to other aspects of his thought; but this is also the sort of inconsistency in which much remains to be mined and reconfigured. The following are some interrelated markers to consider. I will deal first with the ones that revolve primarily around the temporal and spatial aspects to Winnicott’s elaborations. Though I take them to be the most problematic, they fortunately remain the least relevant and hence the most easily dispensable. I will then turn to the procedural ones as I have found them to be most useful.

Priority: Many of Winnicott’s critics, big and small, have been keen, and perhaps not entirely unjustifiably, to point out that the found object cannot be a bridge between inner and outer unless the subject has already, even if provisionally, identified and mapped both sides of the divide, unless, that is, the subject has already acquired some albeit minimal sense of its own reality’s structural and pragmatic demarcations. Put differently, the subject must first consolidate for itself a position and a point of view from which it can distinguish between the inside and the outside, the me and the other-than-me for instance, before it can even recognise and utilise the object as bridge, as found. Contra Winnicott and the classic developmental tendency that locates the subject’s earliest and most primitive experiences in an undifferentiated and omnipotent state, an “oceanic feeling” as Freud was often fond of saying, and then posits frustration, or play, as the driving force behind that subject’s subsequent awakenings to reality and its demands, the found object cannot “antedate” (TOTP-2, 9)∗ established reality testing.

Sequence: Winnicott started out with the insistence that the found object’s richest quality is its ability to consolidate for the subject a space of illusion and play, a space that, in a sense, is free from the constraints of, on the one hand, rough concreteness and, on the other, solipsistic hallucination. Structurally, Winnicott had reached a count of 3 here (Figure 1).

Figure 1

Figure 1

In light of this count, the actual object itself will be decathected to the point where it will lose all meaning; the interaction between subject and object, the interaction whereby the one finds, and/or is found by, the other is what is most important. The fact of this finding must undermine Winnicott’s claim that the found object is merely a bridge to the yet to be established capacity for object relationship since it is none other than the found object that, in the very process of facilitating them, constitutes the encounter and the interaction. Contra Winnicott (again), the bridge that is the found object is not a pointer to future object relations; the bridge is itself an instantiation of that to which it points.

Distinction: By the early 1970’s, Winnicott elaborated further on the quality of this interaction when, with the help of one of his patients, he introduced a distinction between “fantasying” and “dreaming.” Fantasying is an isolated and isolating activity as with, for instance, the daydreaming of the perfect partner, perfect job, perfect home, or perfect finances, the daydreaming of, in sum, the perfect and perfectly satisfying life (the aeternitas) in the face of an intolerably disorganised, unmanageable, and fleeting reality (the tempus). Fantasying instigates no action; it at best runs parallel to and at worst substitutes for life and action; it is a fixity that distracts from and drains objects and relations; it inhibits and at times altogether paralyses them . Dreaming, on the other hand, corresponds to the agility typical of an excursion into an “imaginative planning of the future” (”Dreaming, Fantasying, and Living”, 35), an excursion that precipitates and looks forward to action as much as it is shaped by it (DFL, 26-33). Doctor and patient had come to see that fantasying about an action and dreaming about it belong to two separate orders; indeed, “fantasying was about a certain subject and it was a dead end. It had no poetic value. The corresponding dream, however, had poetry in it, that is to say, layer upon layer of meaning relating to past, present, and future, and to inner and outer, and always fundamentally about [the dreamer]” (DFL, 35; emphasis in the original). Doctor and patient had effectively found themselves in the midst of the aevum that erupts from the dream’s navel and brings about a meshwork of infinite meanings, a meshwork that, lest we forget and by virtue of the fact that it is available for a retrospective interpretation by the analyst, must have already been actively produced by the dreamer/analysand.

Process: With depth and deferral, the difference between fantasying and dreaming has therefore less to do with objects and their inherent qualities and more with processes and effects. In privileging dreaming, Winnicott was not so much singling out an experience grounded in reality, an experience that is more accurate, efficient, or tolerant, and hence more mature than another that repudiates that reality; he was highlighting an experience that is aware of its interconnectedness with and relatedness to reality, without either disavowing it or being completely bound by it . The distinction between dreaming and fantasying may hence be rethought as the difference between experiencing and dissociating (DFL, 26-7), with the proviso that, unlike hallucinating proper, dissociating is never truly cut off from reality. Here, Winnicott seems to be deftly re-conceptualising, and yet without entirely abandoning, Freud’s mid-career elaborations on the defensive mechanism of negation. Much as negation must first acknowledge that which it will come to reject or deny, dissociation is premised on the recognition of a link to reality upon which it may come to act as a severing. Dissociating hence does not occur without its fair share of aggression of which such severing is a telling manoeuvre. Ultimately, and within the context of such dissociating, the experiencing is only a seeming-to-experience (DFL, 28-9) that is there primarily to cover over the fact of its in-experience and/or of its unwillingness to experience.

While located on the other side of illusion and play, fantasying avoids lapsing into hallucination proper. I would hence suggest that fantasying is as much a part of that topological in-between Winnicott labels “transitional” as playing is, and that it might be useful to deploy the transitional as, in one respect at least, a bifurcated space that is occupied by fantasying and dissociating on the one hand and dreaming and playing on the other. Ultimately, what I am suggesting here is that, twenty years after he had first introduced his tripartite structure, Winnicott had effectively moved from a count of 3 to a count of 4 (Figure 2).

Figure 2

Figure 2

Winnicott had flushed out his triadic structure and introduced a space of activity that is of two possible qualities, each of which touches upon the borders of both hallucination and concreteness, resists them just as much as it draws upon their resources.

Yet, and however distinct they may be, fantasying and dreaming remain inextricably implicated in one another. The fixity that is the trademark of fantasying speaks a strong attachment and a wish to revise and preserve as is, in other words, a fidelity to a particular object or situation, while dreaming’s agility is the mark of a mucking about and a taking liberty with whatever it may encounter. As each disposition upholds the distinction in principle, it also undermines it in deed. Reading Winnicott’s text is as close and obvious an illustration of this phenomenon as any. Being faithful to that project requires that the reader step outside of a familiar terrain, even if provisionally, encounter that text, and eventually weave it into his or her already existing structures. Reading Winnicott’s text involves playing with it and taking the liberty to transform its procedures into something other than what simply belongs to either the world of privately held convictions or the world of readings and applications, Winnicott’s included, that are shared and/or objectively perceived∗∗. To a certain extent then, being faithful to Winnicott involves betraying him and the betrayal itself may also be a most Winnicottian thing to do. Obviously, the co-implication of fantasying and dreaming demands a subtler and more complicated assessment than what my example allows. I shall to return to it soon enough.
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∗ I distinguish between TOTP as the original publication of Winnicott’s text and TOTP-2 as the slightly revised version that opens Playing and Reality.
∗∗ The interplay of fidelity and liberty in this process is as applicable to the reader’s own convictions as it is to Winnicott’s text.

Losing Objects

June 1, 2009
Aevum, Found Object, Language, MetaTherapeutics, Play, Speaking Desire, Subjects, Transitionals, Winnicott

Freud thought the dream the royal road to the unconscious and the dream book itself the jewel of his intellectual crown. While only a few of Freud’s followers would comfortably consider donning that crown, many would not hesitate to lay claim to the title of its most deserving guardian and, in the process, to the authority and authorship of its official story. This is a story that, after so many revisions, has become one of succession and access, rivalry and conquest, ownership and meaning. With his notion of the “found,” Winnicott rethinks the story into one of use and findability, into the story of an object (be it a spatula, a dream, an idea, or a practice) that belongs, when it belongs, “to the arts and to religion and to imaginative living, and to creative scientific work” (TOTP, 242) insofar as it is an object found, conjured, used, appropriated, an object hence relinquished, misplaced, misused, misappropriated. Winnicott’s is the story of “the intermediate area” between what is subjective and what is objectively perceived (TOTP, 231). To that area belongs an “object” that has little to do with the typology of the good or the bad, the fetishistic or the partial , an object that has even less to do with the absolute or the fleeting, the mythological or the real.

In telling such a story, Winnicott had effectively set for himself the difficult task of communicating an original perspective that challenges not only a psychoanalytic orthodoxy as it fosters the distinction between subject and object, but also the very structures of language as they speak both the perspective and the orthodoxy. Much as I appreciate the severity of his stylistic constraints, I am reluctant to carry on with the use of the terms “subject” and “object” for it seems to me that, given their habits and histories, these terms can only detract from the spirit of Winnicott’s project. To my mind, to the “intermediate area” belong neither the subject nor the object but the verb in its unfolding: finding, using, dreaming, playing, relinquishing. This verb is neither a passageway out of the subjective and into the objective, out of hallucination and into perception, nor a bridge across which the subject may amble from omnipotence to culture and along with it libido from childhood to maturity.

As an aevum, the verb speaks a process whose cadence gathers those components that, through it and in its space, get to be qualified as subjects and/or objects. Much as there is nothing to an object that renders it inherently irrelevant, much as, in other words, the object becomes irrelevant only in a given situation and as an effect of it being treated as such by a subject, there is nothing to an object that is inherently object-“ive” or to a subject that is inherently subject-“ive,” even when said object and subject are gathered in a single process. It is the verb, as finding, that founds the process and invests its components with their respective states and qualities.

Some will of course object that to the subject belong an inviolable will and an activity that the object in its inertia lacks. While this may very well be the case in the context of certain textbooks of psychology and philosophy, it is not so with respect to the transitional space, to the finding and playing where, already, the object is subjectivised and the subject is woven into the object. The transitional space knows as little of the “object” that is inanimate and unresponsive, that is dead, as the unconscious knows of death itself, which is to say nothing. And if this space knows nothing of the “object,” it might then make some sense to suggest that that space would know equally nothing of the other to that ”object,” of its linguistic and, presumably, psychoanalytic nemesis, the “subject.”

In assessing the viability of this suggestion, three questions present themselves. First, might the Winnicottian perspective not be enhanced if one were to rethink the distinction between subject and object in light of the “experiencing” that belongs to the found, an experiencing whose modes and itineraries may very well underlie the production of certain categories and their presentation as distinct? Second, what then can be said of the production of such distinctions and/or categories, specifically of its dynamics and relationship to the process of play Winnicott is describing? And, finally, third, what, if any, implications does the process of play have on the ways in which we think and live desire? I believe that the answers to these questions begin with Winnicott’s final contributions in Playing and Reality.

From Eruption to Frontier to Aevum…

May 25, 2009
Aevum, Dreams, Found Object, Freud, Limbo, MetaTherapeutics, Secondary Revision, Transitionals, Winnicott

Be it in terms of the settling into the depressive position, the resolution of the Oedipus complex, the attainment of ego integration, the cure, or what not, when psychoanalysis prescribes a so-called “healthy” goal for the libido’s development, it also posits the desirability of the point at which the libido’s vicissitudes will have finally come to rest, the point at which Freud’s volcano will have acquired its crowning layer of lava. This, perversely enough, is also the point at which the volcano and, hence, the libido will have gone cold, become extinguished, died. Much to its subject’s chagrin, or perhaps even relief, the libido does die eventually. However, to suggest that the fact of this death is an indicator of health, or that, better still, it is the hoped for effect, if not indeed the mission, of a psychoanalytic cure is, obviously, a conclusion with which Freud would have been extremely uncomfortable.

This, I believe, is why Freud’s writing of the volcano metaphor is itself a volcanic writing. As the waves of lava, and of libido, gradually pile on top of one another and eventually harden, each may consider itself the summit by virtue of the fact that it is the highest and most recent. But each is such a summit only till the next wave erupts and covers it over, till it is nothing but a layer cushioned in between the before and the after, till, in other words, it is reduced to an entity whose time is the time of flow and decay, of the “not yet” or the “not quite,” falsely asserting itself in a hardening that will hopefully seal the crater and prevent the eruption of future layers that are thicker and harder. True to its pen’s volcanic spirit, no sooner had the ink that wrote the self-sufficiency of discontinuous moments and of the aevum dried on the page, that it got displaced by a dread of tempus and a wish for aeternitas, a dread and a wish that lock the fate of such moments to the laws of succession, accumulation, usurpation, to, in other words, Oedipal rivalry. And should such a manoeuvre not be enough to pre-empt any future questioning of these laws, Freud’s pen did not hesitate to retrace its steps back a decade and re-edit a passage from the Three Essays in order to erase any hint of the aevum and confirm that, once and for all, the “instinct” is indeed a “continuously flowing source of stimulation, as contrasted with a ‘stimulus’, which is set up by single excitations coming from without” (Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 83).

Taken in its entirety, Freud’s thought cannot but both lure and disappoint those in search of a majestic volcano in which each construct, metaphor, and technique is simply a layer that builds on its antecedents and in so doing helps cushion whatever else has yet to come. I hardly wish to rehash the debates surrounding the turns, reversals, breaks, and repressions, regarding, in sum, the vicissitudes of a text and a thought that were over four decades in the making. I invoke the fact of such vicissitudes in order to unsettle one particular (secondary) revision, obviously perpetrated by Freud as much as by his readers, from which both text and thought have suffered: the re-writing of the discovery of an episodic and hence fragmentary libido into a cohesive “intelligible whole” that is the developmental paradigm. Secondary revision, as I have suggested in previous posts, is at bottom an injunction against mutation, transitionality, and finding; it is a prohibition against anything that would undermine its official story, in this case the story of a libido that is traceable, graspable. It would be convenient to think that such a revision is merely a defence against the continued threats emanating from outside the story and the practice, from, presumably, the detractors who have not read enough or analysed enough. But it is the story and the practice themselves that pose the greatest threat to their presumed stability.

“If now we apply ourselves to considering mental life from a biological point of view, an ‘instinct’ appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representation of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body” (“Instincts and their Vicissitudes”, 121-22) . Freud’s topography here has to allow that the “instinct” is equally “the psychical representation of the stimuli originating from within the mind and reaching the organism, as a measure of the demand made upon the body for work in consequence of its connection with the mind,” that, as a frontier, the drive is porous on the side of both the psychical and the somatic, that it is a passage in at least two different directions each trafficking its own set of demands, that its “source” is often as much psychical as it is “a somatic process which occurs in an organ or part of the body and whose stimulus is represented in mental life by an instinct” (ibid, 123). I hope to come back to this question of the drive and its sources later. In the meantime, I single out this passage of Freud’s not so much because it dovetails with the notion of an animated in-between that is the focus of my thoughts and not because it subtly, but perhaps inadvertently, lays the ground for Winnicott’s transitional object, but because it encapsulates Freud’s own long standing fascination with transitionality, a fascination which, by its very definition, questions any and all claims to coherence and completion.

Though he did not explicitly identify the frontier as a central dimension till the mid 1910s, Freud had been quite taken by that frontier from his earliest days. Consider, for instance, the dream book as it elaborates a topography that belongs to the dream as much as it does to the psyche and its three systems (conscious, pre-conscious, and unconscious). The essence of a dream lies in the distortions it performs as, again, “a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work” in consequence of its connection, in this case, with reality (as stimulus and/or residue) and the unconscious (as wish). The space of the dream is hence the Zwischenreich, as Freud writes in a letter to Fliess, that is not so much an intermediary kingdom but the inter-kingdom (the interregnum) and hence the kingdom in between two kings, itself without a king. The “inter” here is temporal (as a transitional phase between the end of one reign and the beginning of another), spatial (as a border territory created by two adjoining provinces ostensibly obeying the laws of neither), and procedural (as a translation or mediation between two otherwise incongruous systems). This is the inter-kingdom of the dream that is nestled in between a seemingly ever lasting and ever gratifying hallucination and a harsh survivalist reality. We find ourselves here not only in the “facilitating” space of the transitional as Winnicott understood it but also in the realm of the aevum. For what is a dream but a diminished hallucination that grows “like a mushroom out of its mycelium” and whose meaning is never a single abiding wish but a meshwork of latent thoughts that “cannot, from the nature of things, have any definite ending” (The Interpretation of Dreams, 5-525)? Such thoughts do not accrue into an ever higher, or reach into an ever deeper, organisation. Freud himself insisted on the necessity of over-interpretation as a clinical disposition that, contrary to what its “over” (or “über” as in “Überdeutung”) may suggest, makes manifest such a meshwork and, in so doing, betrays the hegemony of an overarching and immutable meaning. It is in this context that Freud wrote his by now infamous metaphor of the dream’s “navel” as a tangle of thoughts that cannot be unravelled at the spot where the dream is supposed to reach down into the unknown (ibid). Freud here tangles up two distinct thoughts: the first is that the multitude of interpretations brings the interpreter face to face with the limit of interpretation (the “unknown”); the second is that, since interpretation is the process that reverses the dream work, the “unknown” is less the spot into which the dream reaches and more the spot from which it emerges.

Though its images may appear chaotic and incomplete, the latent time of the dream is no different from the time of the aevum. It has a beginning but is without end. Interpretation brings to light its “succession of meanings” (The Interpretation of Dreams, 4-214) and clarifies the vicissitudo of its infinite series of thoughts, each as a consistent and useful totality in its own right. Tick. Tick. Tick. Tick.

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