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Fetish

        It is in terms of this tension that Deleuze and Guattari will understand the fetish, not as an object, a commodity, or a body part; but as the movement, event, and relationship that reverse the connective synthesis and fix the machine as fatefully miraculated, as, in other words, owing its existence to some body without organs without which it cannot survive.

        Oedipus is a telling example of such a fetish. Indeed, many a post-Freudian reading has further complicated our understanding of the tumultuous relationship between father and son: André Green for instance reminds us that Laius was not simply the innocent victim of patricide but the plotter of his own son’s murder as well. In this context, much remains to be said of Jocasta’s collusion with her husband’s plot and of the ideological silence that surrounds that collusion to this day.

        Still, the structure and logic of the myth persist to the point where it has become virtually impossible to experience the familial, either phenomenally or ideologically, without its Sophoclean recordings. However, and should art or history be our guide and inspiration, then let us not overlook the episode that Herodotus tells of Hippocrates who refused to abide by the prophecy’s warning that he not father a son or if he already has one to disown him. Pisistratus, his offspring, would go on to conquer Athens and serve as its ruler. Neither father nor son in this case was any the poorer for disregarding the codes of the deities and the directives of their prophets (Histories, Book One #59-64).

        To put it bluntly, the logic of the fetish here is the intolerant and singular logic of the “without me, you are noting” that one party fosters and with which another colludes. Author and reader, teacher and student, analyst and analysand, parent and child, ruler and ruled; these are some of the structural couplets that breathe in the stagnant air of resentment without which, and in an ironically doubled and nested move, the corresponding institutions of Literature, Pedagogy, Psychoanalysis, Family, and State would not exist.

        “Without me, you are nothing” is the logic of quasi-causes, of boundaries and restrictions, of confinements and regulations, through which the leak is construed as a threat and the crossing is supposedly a crossing into illegitimacy, chaos, fragmentation, and disintegration. But it is precisely the impermeable boundary itself that divides, consolidates, and reifies the functions of dictator, father, and super ego. Often enough, the crossing is not into chaos but into a more liveable and freer sanity. Instead of health or truth, it is territoriality and power that are the fundamental concerns of the institution and its fetish.

        Ostensibly, this “without me, you are nothing” is but a thin veil for a deep and desperate projection: “without you, I am nothing.” To admit that much is to renounce the fallacy of the hierarchy that allows me to identify myself as your superior (in health, truth, or wealth); it is to renounce my investment in my phantasy of my superiority over you, which is to say, it is to recognize my aggression toward you as someone I wish to subordinate. Freud’s elaborations on the mechanisms of projection and paranoia in his study on Schreber still hold true, as long as one inscribes them within the circuit of the conditional relations of the inter-subjective.

        “We shall not inquire how all this fits together so that the machine will run: the question itself is the result of a process of abstraction” (8). Again, and of the parallel between desiring production and social production: “we intend such a parallel to be merely phenomenological: we are drawing here no conclusion as to the nature and the relationship of the two productions, nor do the parallels we are about to establish provide any sort of a priori answer to the question whether desiring production and social production are really two separate and distinct productions” (10).

        Anti-Oedipus explicitly and persistently repels any attempt to make it accountable for a specific code, arrangement, or meaning. It is no wonder that the barrage of concepts, names, code words, and events maintains an excess of speed where one can no longer differentiate between the various components. The recording is played at the rate of a thousand words per minute. All that one can hear is the taut and opaque barrier of a single note.

        Why would a text wish to repel its reader? What are the uses, applications, or political lessons implicit in such repulsion? And what losses and/or recuperations are inherent to such uses and applications? These questions make as little, and as much, sense as they would if they were posed of an electron repelling another.

        One thing is certain though: the text’s initial overarching and forcefully unbending declarations have now given way to a smooth and icy surface on which a traveller, no matter how well trained or properly equipped, cannot but trip and fall. This fall is bound up with Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of primary repression as repulsion, in this case the repulsion of the desiring machines by the body without organs—an understanding which, interestingly enough, is perfectly in line with that of Freud’s. “On Repression” is unequivocal on this matter: primary repression is the mechanism by which the unconscious is set up as the system that will subsequently endure repression “proper,” secondary re-pression, pressure again. In his seminar on the ethics of psychoanalysis, Lacan had translated Freud’s point in terms of the subject being founded by an act of primary forgetting. Another version of the question: “why would a text wish to repel its reader?” would then be: “why would the subject, why would the I forget?” The answer is that the I is fundamentally incapable of answering such a question for it is not simply the subject of forgetting but its product, as forgetting.

        Similarly, the body without organs does not choose to repel. It is produced as repelling. In its essence, it is not the planned or hoped for outcome of a project or program. Much like production, it is not a goal of human activity, but one of its constitutive moments as that tense and conflictual set of relations without which such activity would not be possible in the first place. I say conflictual because, and as much as we know it as a conditional relation of repulsion, or paranoia as Deleuze and Guattari prefer to think it, we also know the body without organs as a conditional relation of attraction. This is where the parallel, and hence transversality, between desiring production and social production proves to be quite useful. The body without organs (capital for instance) flows; it does not produce anything; but it does record onto itself the machines (labour) it initially repelled. It is through labour that capital gets to reproduce itself. Attraction and repulsion do not cancel each other out; they coexist. The capitalist is proud of his accomplishments, property, factories, and labourers; but he is also adamant on maintaining most of the ideological and economic lines that separate him from these labourers.

        The upshot here is what Deleuze and Guattari term a “social delirium,” a “fetish,” a specific type of recording that regulates the flow and fixes it so as to make of capital a god and of labour a so-called “miraculated” machine that would not have existed without the super-natural powers of such a god and to whom it must henceforth owe its sustenance and value. More on this later.

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