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Dreaming

Interestingly enough, the distinction between fantasying and dreaming and its accompanying language of the “dead end” were not without their parallels for Winnicott. In a series of talks he recorded for the BBC during the 1950s (collected and published under the title of The Child, the Family and the Outside World), and hence from the period shortly after the first appearance of “Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena,” Winnicott flagged “abnormality” as neither a statistical deviation nor a behavioural aberration but as the stagnation in a child’s ability to grow in personality and character. An abnormal child, declared Winnicott, is a child that gets “hung up at some spot” (CFOW, 124) and can go no further in his or her movements and interactions; a normal child, on the other hand, “can employ any or all of the devices nature has provided in defence against anxiety and intolerable conflict” (CFOW, 126-7; emphasis in the original). Consequently, in and of themselves, individual behaviours are neither normal nor abnormal; bed-wetting, for instance, is often an effective protest against strict management while the refusal of food may very well be a rejection of what is experienced as bad. With an ill child, “it is not the symptoms that are the trouble; it is the fact that the symptoms are not doing their job, and are as much a nuisance to the child as to the mother” (CFOW, 127). “Abnormality [Winnicott continues] shows in a limitation and a rigidity in the child’s capacity to employ symptoms and a relative lack of relationship between the symptoms and what can be expected in the way of help” (CFOW, 127; emphasis in the original). Winnicott’s parental concern(∗) was hence focused not on any one particular type or quality of behaviour but on the extent to which a child can use any behaviour, deploy it, and eventually communicate through it. In one respect at least, the psychoanalytic distinction between dreaming and fantasying extends well this concern: dreaming is an index of mobility and interaction that produces its own effects, be they playful, concrete, or illusory, while fantasying is an insular and debilitating end in itself; it brings forth nothing and leads nowhere. Put differently, dreaming grows while fantasying remains “hung up.”

However, and as is often the case with the passage from one reality to another or from one modality to another, Winnicott’s clinical passage from the parental to the psychoanalytic might not have been possible without his reliance on certain less obvious but by no means less critical conceptual considerations. In the spirit of the transitional, one would have to entertain the necessity of such considerations and locate them in the interregnum that is the boundary between the parental and the psychoanalytic as two distinct practices, each with its own standards in matters of procedure, investment, and membership. Curiously, and to my knowledge at least, Winnicott remained silent on the fact of this interregnum and on the conditions and techniques that would make crossing it possible. The effect of this silence is that it reinforces in the reader an impression already sustained by the psychoanalyst’s overarching investment in a clinical practice that, at bottom, is homologous with, if not identical to, parenting, an impression, hence, of a crossing that is effectively a non-event or, at most, an event that occurs with such ease while hardly drawing any attention to itself that it may very well be the symptom of the healthiest and most normal of procedures that are the devices, again, “nature [clinical training] has provided the child [therapist] in defence against anxiety and intolerable conflict [incomprehension and contradiction]” (CFOW, 126-7)! In the face of such “normality,” silence is presumably the most obvious response. However, in response to such a silence, one has a psychoanalytic obligation to ponder the possibility of some underlying anxiety or conflict, assess their eventual impact, and perhaps even investigate the likelihood of responding to them in a way other than the child’s.

Meanwhile, and ever true to his principles, Winnicott was all too keen on propagating this “normality.” Indeed, and with the doctor’s encouragement, it seems as if little need stand in the way of parents becoming their own children’s therapists, as in the case of the mother whose boy suffered from a host of “curious symptoms,” including a most notable obsession with everything to do with strings, for instance. In helping transpose the process of appreciation, verbalisation, and learning from the one dyad (therapist-parent) to the other (parent-child), Winnicott claimed credit for enabling that mother to turn to her little boy and interpret—as a therapist might interpret—his anxiously exaggerated use of a transitional object (a piece of string) by declaring with a confidence and competence that are most inspiring (!) “I can see from your playing with string that you are worried about my going away, but this time I shall only be away a few days, and I am having an operation which is not serious” (TOTP-2, 18). As one might expect, the interpretation yielded the therapeutic response of relieving the boy from his anxiety on the eve of a temporary separation from mother.
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∗ I am opting for the label “parental” as opposed to “paediatric” here because, in the BBC lectures at least, Winnicott the paediatrician was addressing himself as (if he were) a parent to the parents, mostly mothers—as opposed to doctors—encouraging them to trust in the knowledge they have garnered from their experiences of parenting—instead of touting his authority in matters clinical of which they may be ignorant—and, finally, delicately feeding them, as a parent would its offspring, titbits of theory and observation that would make of them even better parents—rather than instructing them in the complexities of diagnosis and treatment.

In the early 1950’s, Winnicott had identified the transitional (whether object, phenomenon, or space) as the bridge between inner life and outer reality, a bridge that, presumably, the subject must set up and continually cross if it is to pursue its developmental journey and reach its full potential as an adult. Twenty years later, Winnicott declared that the clinical focus on the tumultuous relations between the psychic and the shared as separate realities each with its particular set of principles and priorities had long eclipsed serious consideration of a host of experiences that, strictly speaking, belong to neither but are instead grounded in the field of the transitional. In an attempt to redress the paucity of the clinical literature’s treatment of this field and its repercussions for the broader culture, the psychoanalyst decided to republish his “Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena” as the first in a collection of essays (Playing and Reality) that would recast transitionality not only as a function that speaks of a particular psychological dynamic or configuration but as a process that is key in the life of individual and group.

I believe there is more at work in Winnicott’s position from the 1970’s than the simple expansion of a previously elaborated point of view or the restatement, this time louder and more voluminous, literally, of the two-decade-old call that clinical attention be directed toward a crucial but so far under-investigated dynamic. Much as this was the last project Winnicott published in his lifetime and hence, as considered by many, the crowning achievement of his formidable clinical career, the collection stands as less its author’s synthesising and conclusive word on the status and function of the transitional and more as a self-contained but, nonetheless (thankfully), “imperfect” process in which both the transitional and the entire structure within which it operates are re-worked and re-calibrated.

I say “imperfect” because, indeed, there is much inconsistency to Winnicott’s last position, inconsistency of which, I imagine, its author was not entirely unaware, inconsistency to which he evidently had been all too eager to attach the label “paradox” as he had done to other aspects of his thought; but this is also the sort of inconsistency in which much remains to be mined and reconfigured. The following are some interrelated markers to consider. I will deal first with the ones that revolve primarily around the temporal and spatial aspects to Winnicott’s elaborations. Though I take them to be the most problematic, they fortunately remain the least relevant and hence the most easily dispensable. I will then turn to the procedural ones as I have found them to be most useful.

Priority: Many of Winnicott’s critics, big and small, have been keen, and perhaps not entirely unjustifiably, to point out that the found object cannot be a bridge between inner and outer unless the subject has already, even if provisionally, identified and mapped both sides of the divide, unless, that is, the subject has already acquired some albeit minimal sense of its own reality’s structural and pragmatic demarcations. Put differently, the subject must first consolidate for itself a position and a point of view from which it can distinguish between the inside and the outside, the me and the other-than-me for instance, before it can even recognise and utilise the object as bridge, as found. Contra Winnicott and the classic developmental tendency that locates the subject’s earliest and most primitive experiences in an undifferentiated and omnipotent state, an “oceanic feeling” as Freud was often fond of saying, and then posits frustration, or play, as the driving force behind that subject’s subsequent awakenings to reality and its demands, the found object cannot “antedate” (TOTP-2, 9)∗ established reality testing.

Sequence: Winnicott started out with the insistence that the found object’s richest quality is its ability to consolidate for the subject a space of illusion and play, a space that, in a sense, is free from the constraints of, on the one hand, rough concreteness and, on the other, solipsistic hallucination. Structurally, Winnicott had reached a count of 3 here (Figure 1).

Figure 1

Figure 1

In light of this count, the actual object itself will be decathected to the point where it will lose all meaning; the interaction between subject and object, the interaction whereby the one finds, and/or is found by, the other is what is most important. The fact of this finding must undermine Winnicott’s claim that the found object is merely a bridge to the yet to be established capacity for object relationship since it is none other than the found object that, in the very process of facilitating them, constitutes the encounter and the interaction. Contra Winnicott (again), the bridge that is the found object is not a pointer to future object relations; the bridge is itself an instantiation of that to which it points.

Distinction: By the early 1970’s, Winnicott elaborated further on the quality of this interaction when, with the help of one of his patients, he introduced a distinction between “fantasying” and “dreaming.” Fantasying is an isolated and isolating activity as with, for instance, the daydreaming of the perfect partner, perfect job, perfect home, or perfect finances, the daydreaming of, in sum, the perfect and perfectly satisfying life (the aeternitas) in the face of an intolerably disorganised, unmanageable, and fleeting reality (the tempus). Fantasying instigates no action; it at best runs parallel to and at worst substitutes for life and action; it is a fixity that distracts from and drains objects and relations; it inhibits and at times altogether paralyses them . Dreaming, on the other hand, corresponds to the agility typical of an excursion into an “imaginative planning of the future” (”Dreaming, Fantasying, and Living”, 35), an excursion that precipitates and looks forward to action as much as it is shaped by it (DFL, 26-33). Doctor and patient had come to see that fantasying about an action and dreaming about it belong to two separate orders; indeed, “fantasying was about a certain subject and it was a dead end. It had no poetic value. The corresponding dream, however, had poetry in it, that is to say, layer upon layer of meaning relating to past, present, and future, and to inner and outer, and always fundamentally about [the dreamer]” (DFL, 35; emphasis in the original). Doctor and patient had effectively found themselves in the midst of the aevum that erupts from the dream’s navel and brings about a meshwork of infinite meanings, a meshwork that, lest we forget and by virtue of the fact that it is available for a retrospective interpretation by the analyst, must have already been actively produced by the dreamer/analysand.

Process: With depth and deferral, the difference between fantasying and dreaming has therefore less to do with objects and their inherent qualities and more with processes and effects. In privileging dreaming, Winnicott was not so much singling out an experience grounded in reality, an experience that is more accurate, efficient, or tolerant, and hence more mature than another that repudiates that reality; he was highlighting an experience that is aware of its interconnectedness with and relatedness to reality, without either disavowing it or being completely bound by it . The distinction between dreaming and fantasying may hence be rethought as the difference between experiencing and dissociating (DFL, 26-7), with the proviso that, unlike hallucinating proper, dissociating is never truly cut off from reality. Here, Winnicott seems to be deftly re-conceptualising, and yet without entirely abandoning, Freud’s mid-career elaborations on the defensive mechanism of negation. Much as negation must first acknowledge that which it will come to reject or deny, dissociation is premised on the recognition of a link to reality upon which it may come to act as a severing. Dissociating hence does not occur without its fair share of aggression of which such severing is a telling manoeuvre. Ultimately, and within the context of such dissociating, the experiencing is only a seeming-to-experience (DFL, 28-9) that is there primarily to cover over the fact of its in-experience and/or of its unwillingness to experience.

While located on the other side of illusion and play, fantasying avoids lapsing into hallucination proper. I would hence suggest that fantasying is as much a part of that topological in-between Winnicott labels “transitional” as playing is, and that it might be useful to deploy the transitional as, in one respect at least, a bifurcated space that is occupied by fantasying and dissociating on the one hand and dreaming and playing on the other. Ultimately, what I am suggesting here is that, twenty years after he had first introduced his tripartite structure, Winnicott had effectively moved from a count of 3 to a count of 4 (Figure 2).

Figure 2

Figure 2

Winnicott had flushed out his triadic structure and introduced a space of activity that is of two possible qualities, each of which touches upon the borders of both hallucination and concreteness, resists them just as much as it draws upon their resources.

Yet, and however distinct they may be, fantasying and dreaming remain inextricably implicated in one another. The fixity that is the trademark of fantasying speaks a strong attachment and a wish to revise and preserve as is, in other words, a fidelity to a particular object or situation, while dreaming’s agility is the mark of a mucking about and a taking liberty with whatever it may encounter. As each disposition upholds the distinction in principle, it also undermines it in deed. Reading Winnicott’s text is as close and obvious an illustration of this phenomenon as any. Being faithful to that project requires that the reader step outside of a familiar terrain, even if provisionally, encounter that text, and eventually weave it into his or her already existing structures. Reading Winnicott’s text involves playing with it and taking the liberty to transform its procedures into something other than what simply belongs to either the world of privately held convictions or the world of readings and applications, Winnicott’s included, that are shared and/or objectively perceived∗∗. To a certain extent then, being faithful to Winnicott involves betraying him and the betrayal itself may also be a most Winnicottian thing to do. Obviously, the co-implication of fantasying and dreaming demands a subtler and more complicated assessment than what my example allows. I shall to return to it soon enough.
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∗ I distinguish between TOTP as the original publication of Winnicott’s text and TOTP-2 as the slightly revised version that opens Playing and Reality.
∗∗ The interplay of fidelity and liberty in this process is as applicable to the reader’s own convictions as it is to Winnicott’s text.

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