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Connective Synthesis

        In this context, we witness near the closing of the chapter’s first section what might seem like a moment of dialectical abstraction: “desiring-machines make us an organism; but at the heart of this production, within the very production of this production, the body suffers from being organized in this way, from not having some other sort of organization, or no organization at all” (8).

        Deleuze and Guattari seem to be telling us if not the truth of production then at least the truth of its vicissitudes. Supposedly, the linear series of production, recording, and consumption congeals enough to produce its own antithesis: the non-productive dis-organisation that is the body without organs. To some, this may sound distastefully, perhaps even shockingly, Hegelian. Hardly, since the production of the body without organs does not carry with it any evidence of finality; it is qualitatively eruptive and unpredictable. As we shall soon see, and in the face of the borderline’s rigid either/or, one encounters the disjunctive synthesis “either… or… or…” of the schizophrenic.

        While there is much in it that tells us what it does, there is nothing in Anti-Oedipus, so far at least, that explains what a body without organs, or a desiring machine for that matter, is. Instead, we are told what this body without organs is not: it is not a projection; it has nothing to do with the body or with an image of the body; it is not a metaphor; and it has no productive quality whatsoever (8). If Anti-Oedipus is a theory of the body without organs, it records and hence produces that which it theorizes; it is also the process by which it becomes what it theorizes. It not only theorizes the impossibility of imaging, producing a copy, whether good or bad, of the body without organs, it is itself a body without organs and as such, it is unavailable for copying. Any attempt at reproducing in its totality a theoretical image of this body is bound to be unproductive, or productive of another extension of the same organ-less body, or of another body altogether.

        Furthermore, if one accepts this schema of the connective synthesis then, and in one of its registers at least, Anti-Oedipus is to psychoanalysis what the anti-production of the body without organs is to the desiring machines. The “Anti-“ in the text’s title is a reference to its relationship as a product of, and not simply a reaction to or a rejection of, the rigid over-organization of the machines of psychoanalysis as they constitute a clinical practice and a theoretical enterprise. The “Anti-“ is hence one of neither repudiation nor substitution; its effects are momentary and the final word has not been and, thankfully, never can be spoken; the machines will invariably regroup and desire will circulate once again.

        A machine is never on its own.

        One (the machine—the author, the infant, the analysand for instance) is not the originary number. A machine is always producing of a flow, of a product.

        Two (the machine and its flow—author and text, mother and milk, analysand and speech) is not the originary number either. A machine produces not only a product but also a product that is producing of another, that is itself a machine, a consuming machine to be more precise.

        Three (the machine, its flow, and the machine that consumes that flow—author, text, and reader; mother, milk, and infant; analysand, speech, and analyst) is still not the originary number. The presence of a machine presupposes not only another that it produces but yet a third by which it had been preceded and produced, and so on.

        Infinity is the originary number. The presence of a machine is made possible only in an infinite series or string (and… and… and…) of connecting, producing, consuming, and recording machines. The series itself can exist only in an immensely complicated matrix or network of production among whose components we may count sexuality, kinship, market forces, intellectual histories, legal and juridical constraints, scientific and aesthetic achievements, and physiological contingencies. Ultimately, meaning resides in such activities; it is not deferred till the moment of a product as an end.

        The clinical implication here is twofold. First, the distinction between reality and unconscious phantasy, between what belongs to the everyday and what is “properly” psychoanalytic, is in the understanding of the relationships and events between machines (production, consumption, etc…) and not in the nature of the object as such. The priority then is to appreciate that the clinical practice and its material and ideological surround are fundamentally implicated in one another. Second, the notion of termination as cure, truth, or position is never truly “terminal;” the connective synthesis is endless in its dynamic and the clinical concern, as indeed it has now become for many, is much less with an end to a process than it is with its extension beyond the point where the presence of the analyst is mandatory.

        In the context of a connective synthesis, a machine or a chain of associations works only when it breaks down. It works by breaking down, continually, by having the flow it produces interrupted and consumed by another that is inevitably produced by it.

        “Breaking down” in the French original is actually “detraquée.” The word suggests not so much a malfunction but the impression of something gone awry, derailed. The “breaking down” of a machine is tantamount to the detours of slips, dreams, and symptoms that psychoanalysis has rightly marked as not so much proofs of the unconscious but rather products of its inner workings. As much as they are compromise formations designed to appease the demands of the secondary process, slips, dreams, and symptoms are odd, slippery.

        The question that has so far preoccupied psychoanalysis has been the identification and resolution, or at least containment, of the conflict that underlies such formations through a retrograde analysis; schizoanalysis marks them not only as effects but as causes and machines as well. How can they be re- or differently aligned? What can they be made to produce? What new sounds, significations, or formations do they point to? The question of effect and machine is always double: “Given a certain effect, what machine is capable of producing it? And given a certain machine, what can it be used for?” (3).

        Of the connective synthesis of production (and… and… and…): the chain of free associations is not simply a representation of an underlying dynamic, a metaphor for latent peculiarities, or a symptom of as yet undisclosed conflicts and possibilities.

        In its vagaries and detours, this chain is a machine whose flow is recorded and consumed by an ear, be it that of the analyst or the analysand. It produces an effect, an impression, and an experience that, in turn will engender further associations and impressions.

        To speak of psychoanalysis is to speak of a journey along a complex and multi-layered network of such chains. At best, and though the analyst may be familiar with the terrain, it is the analysand who also steers the process, decides which nodes or junctions to traverse, or, better still, which nodes or junctions to create in order to traverse. The analyst has no way of telling in advance how the adventure will unfold, let alone end, for it is the analysand’s as well. The couch disencumbers both from some of the weight of identification.

        I close my eyes as my analysand’s sounds become my images, thoughts, intensities, not so much of where or what she’s been but of what she is now making of where or what she thinks she’s been. It is not she that I see through her words but what she produces in me, which is not entirely me. What I say, if I say anything at all, and what I do not say, what of all that I do not say she chooses to hear, may or may not link up with what she already sees, thinks, and experiences. The flows of words, hers and mine, are products that not only record (speak) pre-existing, and hence consumable (heard) identities, understandings, and affects; they also produce further associations and understandings.

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